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The Definition of Security: Marine Bank v. Weaver' — The Securities Act of
1933 2 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934s regulate transactions involving
securities.* While applicability of the securities acts' regulations' therefore re-
1
 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
15 U.S.C. 55 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
15 U.S.C.	 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
* See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 55 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. II 1978) and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S.0 . 55 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The primary
purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to eliminate
serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market. United Housing Found. Inc. v. For-
man, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975). The Senate Report on the bill that became the Securities Act of
1933 stated:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business. The
basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be
offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against
fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation, to place adequate
and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking
capital by honeSt presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest
securities offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence
of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into pro-
ductive channels of industry and development capital which has grown timid to the
point of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and
consuming power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 17.1 ( J. Ellenberger
and E. Mahar eds. 1973).
President Roosevelt, in his 1934 message to Congress proposing securities legislation,
stated:
I recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation providing for the
regulation by the Federal Government of the operations of exchanges dealing in
securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of
values, and so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise,
and destructive speculation.
S. REP. NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT of 1934, Item 17.1 ( J. Ellenberger
and E. Mahar eds. 1973).
For a scholarly examination of theories connecting the 1929 stock Market Crash with
abuses in the stock market, see generally FitzGibbon, What is a Security? — A Redefinition Based on
Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893, 912-18 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as FitzGibbon].
Two examples of the protection afforded by the federal securities acts' regulations are
5 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section
17(a) of the 1933 Act (currently codified as 15 U.S.C. 5 77 q(a) (1976)) provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ... directly or
indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
1.5 U.S.C. S 77q(a) (1976).
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quires that the transaction involve a security, 6 what constitutes a security is
often unclear due to the acts' broad and ambiguous definitions.' The breadth
and ambiguity of the securities acts' definitions are attributable to the use of
such indefinite statutory language as, "unless the context otherwise requires,"
"an instrument commonly known as a security," and an "investment con-
Courts of appeals disagree over whether a private cause of action exists under section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. Compare Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d
808, 815 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a private cause of action exists under $ 17(a)) and Kirshner
v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), reh'g
en bane denied, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979) (holding that a private
cause of action exists under $ 17(a)) with Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th
Cir. 1977), reh'g denied, 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that no private cause of action ex-
ists under 5 17(a)). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act (currently codified as 15 U.S.C. 5 78 (1976))
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange — (b) To use or employ, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. $ 78 (1976).
It is well established that a private cause of action exists under $ 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (dicta). Nevertheless, the Court has never expressly held that such a cause
of action exists. See Casenote, A Scienter Requirement for SEC Injunctions Under 10(b) — Investor Protec-
tion Under the Securities Laws is Further Restricted, Aaron v. SEC, 22 B.C.L. REV, 595, 595-96, n.7
(1981).
6
 See generally, Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 55 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. II 1978);
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 55 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
2
 The statutory definitions of "security" provided by these acts are virtually identical.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967). The Securities Act of 1933 defines
"security" as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires —
(1) the term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any cer-
tificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the forego-
ing.
Securities Act of 1933 5 2(1), 15 U.S.C. 5 77b (1976).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "security" as follows:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires —
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, deben-
ture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any in-
strument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any
note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
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tract. "e In response to this indefinite statutory language, the Supreme Court of
the United States has repeatedly attempted to clarify what instruments qualify
as securities. 9 Recently, in Marine Bank v. Weaver," the Court again considered
the meaning of security within the acts' ambit, and articulated its narrowest
construction yet for what instruments qualify for protection under the
securities laws."
Prior to Marine Bank, the Supreme Court considered a number of cases
raising the question of what instruments were securities for purposes of the
securities acts.' 2
 The term "investment contract," in particular has been the
focus of a great deal of litigation in the Supreme Court." In an early decision,"
the Court initially indicated that instruments qualified as investment contracts
— and thus "securities" — if they were widely offered or dealt in under terms
or courses of dealing which established their "character in commerce" as in-
vestment contracts," or as any interests or instruments commonly known as
securities." Subsequently, the Court modified this "character in commerce"
test and established what has since been considered the classical test." This
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. 5 78c(a)(10) (1976).
9 Id. In particular, the term "investment contract" has been employed by the courts as
a "catch-all" See, 1 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION, 483-511 (2d Ed. 1961), [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
9 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558-70 (1979)
(holding employee's participation in compulsory pension plan not an "investment contract" and
therefore not a security); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847-60 (1975)
(holding shares of stock purchased by tenants of publicly financed low-income housing projects as
prerequisite for occupancy, not "investment contracts" and therefore not securities); Tcherep-
nin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-46 (1967) (holding withdrawable capital shares of savings and
loan association to be securities); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 67-73
(1959) (holding variable annuity contracts to be securities); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 279-301 (1946) (holding sales contracts for units of citrus grove development coupled with
contracts to service citrus trees to be "investment contracts" and therefore securities); SEC
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351-55 (1943) (holding contracts to sell assignments
of oil leases containing economic inducements of proposed exploration wells to be securities).
. 10
 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
" See infra notes 204-26 and accompanying text.
17
 See supra note 9.
" See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558-70 (1979);
United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-55 (1975); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 297-301 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351-55 (1943).
14
 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
15
 The elastic term "investment contract" appears in the statutory definition of
"security" in both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See supra
note 7.
16
 SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943). For a further discus-
sion of the G.M. Joiner Leasing Corp. test, see infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
17
 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Courts considering securities cases
have generally relied on the Homey characterization of an "investment contract." See, e.g., Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc.
v. Forman 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967); Cana-
dian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 1980);
Bradt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1979); Grenader v. Spitz, 537 F.2d 612,
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classical test states that an instrument is an "investment contract," and
thereby constitutes a security, if it is a contract, transaction or scheme whereby
an individual invests money in a common enterprise with the expectation of
gaining profits solely through the efforts of others. la This test was subsequently
narrowed by the addition of three requirements.' 9 First, the profits sought had
to result from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of someone other than the
individual investor." Second, the profits sought could not take the form of a
commodity for personal consumption." Finally, there had to be a separable
element constituting consideration for the security. 22 This refined classical test
was not modified again until Marine Bank.
In Marine Bank v. Weaver , 23 the Supreme Court further narrowed the
classical test of what qualified as an investment contract/security as defined by
the federal securities acts, by imposing two additional requirements. 24 First,
the security must retain an element of risk such that the investment may result
in loss." Second, the security cannot be too unique." The facts of Marine Bank
were largely undisputed." Beginning in 1976, Marine Bank" made three loans
to Columbus Packing Company, an unincorporated wholesale slaughterhouse
and retail meat market owned as a proprietorship by Raymond and Barbara
618-19 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1009 (1976); Safeway Portland Employees Fed.
Credit Union v, C.H. Wagner & Co., 501 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental
Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,
Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. Herr,
338 F.2d 607, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 999 (1966); Roe v. United States, 287
F.2d 435, 438 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961); Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mex-
ico, 459 F. Supp. 841, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.
N.Y. 1979); Hamblett v. Board of Say. & Loan Ass'ns, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 158, 165 (MD. Miss.
1979); Hendrickson v. Buchbinder, 465 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Sunshine
Kitchens v. Alanthus Corp., 403 F. Supp. 719, 720-21 (S.D. Fla. 1975); SEC v. Orange Grove
Tracts, 210 F. Supp. 81, 83 (D. Mass. 1962).
In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, (1975), the Supreme Court
noted that the Timmy test "embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's
decisions defining a security." Id. at 852.
18
	v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). For an examination of
Howe,, see infra notes 77-106 and accompanying text.
13 The test was narrowed by the Court's holdings in International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439, U.S. 551, 550-60 (1979) and United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
855, 858 (1975). For a discussion of these two cases, see infra notes 105-63 and accompanying
text.
20 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975).
21 Id. at 858.
22 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559.60 (1979).
25 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
24 Id. at 557-60. For an examination of Marine Bank demonstrating that the Court added
two requirements — risk and uniqueness — to the Howe, test, see infra notes 164-203 and accom-
panying text.
23 Id. at 557-59,
" Id. at 559-60.
17 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
28 Marine Bank was a federally regulated bank. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at
558.
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Piccirillo." The loans were secured by perfected security interests in several of
the company's business assets and second mortgages on two pieces of real
estate." Early in 1978, a newly-appointed branch manager of Marine Bank
designated the loans as "concerned loans" because he did not believe that Co-
lumbus Packing had adequate cash flow and because the proprietorship had no
set repayment program. 31
 In addition to the outstanding loans, the proprietor-
ship had a substantial overdraft position with the bank. 32
 Consequently,
Marine Bank informed Mr. Piccirillo that it would levy on the collateral unless
the Piccirillos either sold the business and paid the bank, closed the business
and sold its assets to pay the bank, or secured additional capital."
Rather than follow through on this course of action, however, the bank ex-
ecuted a new agreement with the Piccirillos on March 17, 1978. 34 By the terms
of this agreement, Marine Bank loaned Columbus Packing $65,000 on a
secured demand note signed by the Piccirillos." As additional security, the
bank accepted a guarantee agreement signed by a farming couple, Sam and
Alice Weaver, 36
 guaranteeing payment of the Piccirillo's debt to a maximum of
$50,000. 37
 The Weavers secured the guarantee agreement by pledging" to
29
 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
3° Id.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id.
34 Id
35 Id. The note was secured as the previous Loan had been. Id. See supra text accompany-
ing note 30 for security interest pledged.
" Neither Mr. Weaver nor Mrs. Weaver, aged 79 and 71 respectively, had any formal
education beyond the eighth grade. Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
32 Id.
38
 The Weavers brought suit in federal court under the anti-fraud provisions of 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 554 (1982).
To meet the threshold requirements of 10(b), the Weavers alleged — in addition to alleging
that a certificate of deposit is a security — that the pledge of the security is a sale of a security.
Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1980) rev'd 455 U.S. 551 (1982). Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that there be a purchase or sale of a security.
See supra note 5 for text of S 10(b). See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 730-31 (1975) (holding only purchasers or sellers of securities have standing to sue under S
10(b)). The Supreme Court has held that a pledge of stock is equivalent to a sale for purposes of
the Securities Act of 1933. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 431 (1981). Moreover, in a
footnote in Marine Bank, the Court, while not deciding the issue, implied that Rubin applies to
both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by stating that "[we] held
in Rubin v. United States ... that a pledge of stock is equivalent to a sale for the purposes of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 554 n.2
(emphasis added). Nonetheless, the issue of whether a pledge is a sale for purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is unresolved. Compare Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F,2d 157,
163-64 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) and Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1028-30 (6th Cir. 1979) and Mallis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
568 F.2d 824, 828-30 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 434 U.S. 928
(1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 381, 388 (1978) (all holding pledge is a
"sale" under Securities Exchange Act of 1934) with Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d
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Marine Bank a $50,000 certificate of deposit issued by the bank to them. 39 In
consideration for the loan guarantee, the Piccirillos promised to pay the
Weavers $100 per month plus 50 percent of Columbus Packing's "adjusted net
profits."" The agreement between the Piccirillos and the Weavers also provid-
ed that the Weavers could use the barn and pastures of the slaughterhouse at
the Piccirillos' discretion, and that the Weavers could veto future loans to the
slaughterhouse . 41
The proceeds of the $65,000 loan were used by the Piccirillos to repay
slaughterhouse loans and overdraft obligations to the bank totaling approx-
imately $42,000, to pay past due obligations to trade creditors and to pay feder-
al back taxes." The remaining working capital after these expenses totaled ap-
proximately $3,800." Four months after entering into this arrangement, Co-
lumbus Packing filed a petition for bankruptcy.** Since the assets of Columbus
Packing and the Piccirillos serving as security were inadequate to cover the
amount of the loan outstanding," the bank expressed its intent to realize its
claim against the Weavers' certificate of deposit to recover the deficiency." In
response, the Weavers brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania." The Weavers alleged that by soliciting the
loan guarantee while knowing, but not disclosing, Columbus Packing's finan-
cial plight or Marine Bank's plans to repay itself from the guaranteed loan,"
1038, 1040-45 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding pledge not a "sale" under Securities Exchange Act of
1934) and National Bank of Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298-1300 (5th
Cir. 1978) (arguing pledge not a "sale" under Securities Exchange Act of 1934). For an analysis
of whether a pledge constitutes a sale under the 1934 Act see Casenote, New Protection for Defrauded
Pledges of Securities Under Federal Securities Laws: Rubin v. United States, 23 B.C.L. REV. 821 (1982).
See also, Note, A Pledge of Stock in a Commercial Loan: "Purchase or Sale" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934?, 1979 ARIZ. ST . L. J. 669 (1979); Note, Applicability of Rulel0b-5 to Pledges of Securities,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 547 (1980); Case Comment, Caveat Lender-Federal Securities Law Does Not Apply
to a Commercial Loan Secured by a Pledge of Securities, Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1039
(7th Cir. 1979), 56 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1227 (1980); Case Comment, Pledge of Securities as Loan
Collateral Does Not Constitute a "Sale" as Required by Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Lincoln National Bank v. Herber, 604 F.2d 1039 (7th Cir. 1979), 11
CUM. L. REV. 237 (1980).
" Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157,159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
To purchase the certificate of deposit from Marine Bank's Corry branch, the Weavers
withdrew $50,000 from another bank. Id. The certificate of deposit was payable in six years and
bore interest at 7 'h %. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 552-53, n. 1 .
40
 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
1 ' Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. at 560.
47
 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
43 Id.
44 Id.
" For security interest pledged see supra text accompanying note 30.
46
 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
47 Id. at 157.
46
 455 U.S. at 554 (1982). The Weavers claimed that pendant jurisdiction empowered
the federal district court to hear their state law claims against Marine Bank. Id.
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Marine Bank had committed common law fraud" and had violated the anti-
fraud provisions of both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5° and the Pennsyl-
vania Securities Act." The district court entered summary judgment in favor
of Marine Bank on the federal securities claim, holding that if a wrong had oc-
curred it was not connected with the purchase or sale of a "security" as defined
by the federal securities acts. 52
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate, since a jury
could find that either the certificate of deposit or the agreement with the Picci-
rillos constituted a security." In a unanimous opinion, however, the Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court, holding that as a matter of law, the certificate
of deposit did not constitute a security because it did not involve risk to the in-
vestor," and that the agreement between the Weavers and Piccirillos did not
qualify as a security because it was too unique." In essence, the Marine Bank
Court added two new requirements — risk and uniqueness — to what consti-
tutes a security under the federal securities laws. 55 By its holding, the Court has
made it more difficult for potential investors to sue under the federal securities
acts." A prospective plaintiff must not only establish that the transaction in
question satisfies the classical test, but must also demonstrate that it passes
Marine Bank's risk and non-uniqueness requirements."
This casenote examines the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
Marine Bank on the definition of what constitutes an "investment contract" for
purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
In its first section, the casenote traces the historical development of the defini-
tion of a security for the purposes of these acts. The second section of this ar-
ticle is composed of four subsections. The first subsection examines the Court's
reasoning for determining that neither the certificate of deposit nor the agree-
ment between the Weavers and the Piccirillos constituted a security. The sec-
ond subsection considers the significance and potential impact of the Marine
Bank holding, and suggests that the Court effectively narrowed the definition of
"security" in Marine Bank — thereby decreasing the scope of the protection af-
49 637 F.2d at 159.
5° Id. For the text of the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see
supra note 5.
5 ' Id, Pennsylvania Securities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 70, §§ 1-101 (Purdon Supp.
1980).
' Weaver v. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. 551, 554 (1982).
" Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 161-65, (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
" Marine Bank v, Weaver, 455 U.S. 557-59.
" Id. at 559-60.
56
 For a further discussion of the Court's addition of these two requirements, sec infra
notes 164-203 and accompanying text.
57
 For an examination of how the addition of the risk and non-uniqueness requirements
have made it more difficult for potential investors to sue under the federal securities acts, see infra
notes 227-35 and accompanying text.
58 Id.
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forded by the federal acts, and increasing the importance of state blue sky
laws," common law and other federal regulatory laws. The third subsection
presents a critique of the Court's risk and non-uniqueness requirements. It will
be submitted that the risk and non-uniqueness requirements, while effectively
narrowing the breadth of the securities acts' protection, were not sufficiently
defined by the Marine Bank Court, and will require further refinement. The
final subsection proposes a modification of Marine Bank's risk and non-
uniqueness requirements that remedies this problem.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF "SECURITY"
Since the enactment of the federal securities acts, the definition of security
has evolved in a number of Supreme Court decisions." This burden of statu-
tory construction fell to the Court due to the broad all-encompassing language
employed by Congress in the acts' definitional sections. 6 ' The definitional sec-
tion of the Securities Act of 1933 contains such elastic terms as "unless the con-
text otherwise requires," "investment contract" and "any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security.' "62 Likewise, the definitional section of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes the flexible terms "unless the con-
text otherwise requires," "investment contract" and "any instrument com-
monly known as a 'security.' "63 The flexibility and ambiguity of these terms
have left to the Court the task of developing coherent guidelines for what con-
stitutes a security.
In one of its early security definition cases, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Corp. , 64 the
Court focused its definition test on the character a particular instrument is giv-
en in commerce. 65 The Court noted that an instrument is an investment con-
tract, and therefore a security, if it is widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established its "character in commerce" as an invest-
ment contract, or as any interest or instrument commonly known as a
security. 66 The defendants in Joiner were engaged in a campaign to sell
assignments of oil leases. 67
 The sales campaign, conducted through the mail by
the use of sales literature, was addressed to nearly 1,000 prospects scattered
" The expression "blue sky," which refers to state security regulations traces its
origins to the passage of the 1911 Kansas licensing statute. Loss, supra note 8, at 27 (2d ed. 1961)
(quoting Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37, 37 (1916)). The statute's supporters indicated
that it was proposed with an eye towards "promoters who 'would sell building lots in the blue sky
in fee simple.' " Id.
60 See supra note 9.
61 For the text of the acts' definitions of security, see supra note 7.
62
 Securities Act of 1933 5 2(1), 15 U.S.C. 77b (1976). For the text of the act's defini-
tion of security, see supra note 7.
63 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. 5 78(a)(10) (1976). For the
text of the act's definition of security, see supra note 7.
65 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
65 Id. at 351.
" Id.
67
 Id. at 345.
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throughout the country. 68 The sales literature assured the prospective buyer
that the Joiner Company was currently engaged m and would complete the
drilling of a test well to determine the oil-producing possibilities of the offered
leaseholds." The Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit in district
court alleging that the sales campaign violated the Securities Act of 1933. 7 ° The
issue presented in Joiner, therefore, was whether the contracts to sell these
assignments of oil leases were investment contracts/securities for purposes of
the Securities Act of 1933. 7 '
Applying the "character in commerce" test, the Joiner Court concluded
that contracts to sell the assignments of oil leases were investment contracts and
therefore securities within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933. 72 The
Court reasoned that the purchasers were not, as a practical matter, paying for
naked leasehold rights." Rather, they were paying for both a lease and a devel-
opment project. 74 The defendant's intention was to sell documents which of-
fered the purchaser a chance, without undue delay or additional cost, of shar-
ing in oil discovery values that might follow from the ongoing exploration for
oil. 75
After Joiner, instruments were deemed investment contracts within the
federal securities acts' definitions of a security if they were widely offered or
dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in
commerce as an investment contract, or as any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a security." Three years after Joiner, the Supreme Court in
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co." modified the "character in commerce" test and ar-
ticulated what has since been viewed as the classical test for what constitutes a
security." In Howey, the named defendant, W.J. Howey Company," owned
large tracts of citrus acreage in Florida. 8° For several years the company had
planted approximately 500 acres annually while offering another 500 acres of
the grove to the public to help finance additional development. s' In conjunc-
tion with the sales contract, the company offered prospective purchasers a ser-
vice contract, informing them that investing in a citrus grove was infeasible
" Id. at 346. The leasehold subdivisions offered in the sale never exceeded twenty acres
and usually covered two and one-half to five acres at a price of $5 to $15 per acre. Id.
69 Id.
7 ° Id. at 345.
71 Id. at 348.
" Id. at 351.
73 Id. at 348.
74 Id. at 349.
" Id. at 348.
" Id.
" 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
78 See supra note 17.
79 Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. was an unnamed defendant in the case. Id. at
294-95.
8° Id. at 295.
81 Id. The acres were arranged in units such that each acre consisted of a row of 48
trees. Id.
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unless service arrangements were made. 82 Concerning service arrangements,
the company stressed the superiority of Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. 83 As a
result of these sales tactics, eighty-five percent of the acreage sold from 1940
through 1943 was serviced by Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc." Prospective
purchasers were encouraged to enter into a ten-year contract with the service
company. 85 Under the contract, the service company would be granted a lease-
hold interest in the acreage plus complete discretion and authority concerning
cultivating, harvesting and marketing the citrus crops. 86
Since the contracts were not registered pursuant to the federal securities
acts, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit in district court alleg-
ing that W.J. Howey Company and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. had vio-
lated the Securities Act of 1933. 87 The Commission contended that the sales
and service contracts were investment contracts/securities within the meaning
of the Act, and therefore had to comply with the statutory mandates. 88 Both
lower courts determined that these sales and service contracts were not invest-
ment contracts/securities within the ambit of the 1933 Act. 89
Rejecting this determination, the Supreme Court drew on the state court's
broad interpretation of what constitutes an investment contract within the
scope of state blue sky laws, 9° and established the classical test for defining a
security. The Howey Court noted that an instrument is an investment contract
— and thus a security — if it is a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise91 and is led to expect profits
82
" Id.
84 Id.
88 Id. 296.
" Id.
" Id. at 244.
" Id. at 297.
" Id. at 297-98.
98 Id. at 298. The major state case relied upon by the Howey Court was Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920), in which the state supreme court defined an
investment contract as a contract or scheme for "the placing of capital or laying out of money in a
way intended to secure income or profit from its employment." Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938.
" There are conflicting authorities on the issue of whether a common enterprise re-
quires the pooling of money of various investors (i.e., "horizontal commonality"), or whether a
one-to-one relationship between an investor and an investment manager will suffice (i.e., "ver-
tical commonality"). For a description of these conflicting authorities, see Troyer v. Karcagi, 476
F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48, (S.D. N.Y. 1979). The Ninth Circuit has characterized a common
enterprise as "one in which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with, and dependent
upon, the efforts and success of those seeking the investment . " SEC v. Glenn Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 480-81 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
92 The requirement that the profits be expected solely from the efforts of others has been
relaxed to allow the investor some participation. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding pyramid marketing scheme, in which selling efforts of
investor were partially responsible for investor's profits, involved a security, indicating that "the
critical inquiry is 'whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enter-
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solely" from the efforts of a promoter or a third party." The Howg Court
found that the prospective purchasers were attracted by the expectation of
substantial profits," and determined that all the elements of a profit-seeking
business venture were present." The Court concluded that the sales contracts
for the units of citrus grove development, coupled with the contracts to service
the citrus trees, constituted securities for purposes of the Securities Act of
I933. 96
After Howg, instruments were investment contracts, and therefore
securities, if they met Howey's three-pronged test." First, there must be an in-
vestment of money;" second, the investment must be made in a common en-
terprise, 99
 with the expectation of gaining profits;'°° third, the profits must re-
sult solely'w from the efforts of others.'" The Howey test is narrower than the
Joiner test 1 °3 because it is less flexible. While the Joiner test has one general re-
quirement,'" the Howey test has three specific requirements. Moreover, the
Howey test has been even further narrowed by two subsequent major Supreme
prise' ") (quoting SEC v. Glenn Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)); Securities Act Release No. 5347,38 Fed. Reg, 1735 (1973); reprinted
in [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) i 79,163 (condominiums offered to-
gether with servicing arrangements can constitute securities because "an investment contract
may be present in situations where an investor is not wholly inactive") (cited in FitzGibbon,
supra note 4, at 900 n.24). In United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the
Supreme Court expressly declined to indicate whether the Turner court was correct on this issue.
Id. at 852 n.16.
State courts have also demonstrated a relaxing of the requirement that the profits be ex-
pected solely from the efforts of others. See, e.g. , State v. Hawaii Market Center, 52 Haw. 642,
485 P.2d 105 (1971) ("[i]t is irrelevant to the remedial purposes of the Securities Act that an in-
vestor participates in a minor way in the operations of the enterprise. Courts should focus on the
quality of the participation. In order to negate the finding of a security the offeree should have
practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise. For it is control which
gives the offeree the opportunity to safeguard his own investment, thus obviating the need for
state intervention." Id. at 651-52, 485 P.2d at III).
However, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 445 U.S. 551 (1982), the Court, while deciding
the case on other grounds, expressly noted that a contract provision giving the Weavers veto
power over future loans gave them a measure of control over the operation of the slaughterhouse
not characteristic of a security. Id. at 560. For a discussion of the Howey test from the perspective
of the amount of control exercised, see Newton, What Is a Security? A Critical Analysis, 48 MISS. L.
J. 167, 190 (1977).
" SEC v. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
94 Id.
" Id. at 300.
" Id. at 299.
97 When applying the Howey test, courts generally break it down into three prongs. See,
e,g,, Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
98 Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
" Id. The issue of whether a common enterprise requires "horizontal commonality,"
or whether "vertical commonality" will suffice is largely unresolved. See supra note 91.
100 328 U.S. at 299.
'°' The requirement that the profits result solely from the efforts of others has been re-
laxed on both the federal and state levels. See supra note 92.
102 328 U.S. at 299.
103 For a discussion of the Joiner test, see supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
'Q .' The general requirement in thefoiner test is that the instrument be widely offered or
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Court decisions — United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 1 ° 5 and International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.'" In Forman, the Court added two require-
ments to Howey's profits prong.'° 7 First, the expected profits must result from
the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.'" Second, the expected profits
must not be in the form of a commodity for personal consumption.'" In Daniel,
the Court added the requirement that there be a separable element constituting
consideration for the security."°
In Forman, the tenants of Co-op City," a publicly financed low-income
housing project, were required to purchase shares of stock as a condition of oc-
cupying an apartment." 2 These shares served the sole purpose of enabling a
purchaser to occupy a Co-op City apartment."s The shares carried no voting
rights, could not be transferred to a nontenant, could not be pledged or encum-
bered and descended with the apartment only to a surviving spouse." 4 A ten-
ant who wished to terminate his occupancy or was forced to move out, was re-
quired to offer his shares — at the original purchase price" 5 — to Riverbay, a
corporation organized to own and operate Co-op City."" If in the "extreme
unlikely event" that Riverbay declined to repurchase the stock, the tenant
could not sell it for more than the initial purchase price.'" The tenant was fur-
ther restricted by the fact that the stock could be sold only to a prospective ten-
ant satisfying the statutory income eligibility.'"
At the outset, the Court rejected the holding by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit"° that the shares in question were securities for
the purposes of federal securities law simply because they were deemed to be
"stock" by the issuers.'" Although the definitional sections of the federal
dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as an in-
vestment contract, or as any interest or instrument commonly known as a security. SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
'° 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
106 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
'"' 421 U.S. at 855, 858.
I°8 Id. at 855.
l" Id. at 858.
"° Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559-60.
"' Fifty-seven residents of Co-op City sued in federal district court on behalf of all
15,372 apartment owners. Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (S.D.
N.Y. 1973). The residents alleged violations of the fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. Named as defendants were United Housing Foun-
dation, Community Services, Inc., Riverbay, several individual directors of these organizations,
the State of New York, and the State Private Housing Finance Agency. Id.
" 2 421 U.S. at 842.
"3
 Id.
" 4 Id.
'" Id. at 842. The original purchase price was $25.00 per share. Id. at 841.
16 Riverbay was a corporation organized to own and operate the land and buildings at
Co-op City. Id.
" 7 Id. at 843.
11E1 Id.
"3 500 F.2d 1246, 1255 (2d Cir. 1974).
10 421 U.S. at 846-47.
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securities acts include the word "stock,"''' the Forman Court ruled that such a
designation by the issuing party would not be dispositive of the definitional
issue. 122
 The Court noted that form should be disregarded for substance,' 23
and found that the shares in Forman were not securities within the meaning of
the securities acts because they did not possess the characteristics associated
with stock. 124
The Court then turned to an analysis of the Second Circuit's finding that
the stocks in question were securities because they were investment con-
tracts.' 25 Concerning Howey's profit prong, the Second Circuit determined that
the stocks had the potential for generating profits from three sources.'" First,
the circuit court found that the rental reductions resulting from the income pro-
duced by the commercial facilities established for the use of tenants at Co-op
City were a source of profits.'" Second, the appellate court determined that the
tax deductions for the portion of the monthly rental charges allocable to interest
payments on the mortgage were another source of profits.'" Finally, the court
found that the savings attributable to the fact that apartments at Co-op City
cost substantially less than comparable nonsubsidized housing were a source of
profits.'"
Rejecting the appeals court's reasoning regarding profits, the Furman
Court distinguished all three asserted sources from its Howey requirement.
First, the Court found that the rental reductions from the income produced by
the commercial facilities established for the tenant's use at Co-op City did not
qualify as profits under Howey."° The Court indicated that the potential in-
come from these commercial facilities was far too speculative and insubstantial
to bring the entire transaction within the securities acts.' 3 ' The Court con-
cluded that the distinguishing factor in the Forman transaction was that the
profits in Forman were in the form of a commodity for personal consumption. 132
Second, the Supreme Court determined that the deductions for the portion of
the monthly rental charges allocable to interest payments on the mortgage did
not qualify as profits within the meaning of Howey. 133 The Court reasoned that
these benefits were available to all homeowners who were paying interest on
their mortgage, and, as such, were not unique to this situation.' 34 Finally, the
121 For text of statutory definitions, see supra note 7.
122
 421 U.S. at 848.
123
 Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)).
124 Id. at 851. For the unique characteristics of the shares, see supra notes 111-18 and ac-
companying text.
'" Id. at 851. For the Second Circuit's finding, see 500 F.2d,1246, 1255 (2d Cir. 1974).
126 500 F.2d 1246, 1254 (2d Cir. 1974).
127 Id.
'" Id.
129 Id.
13° 421 U.S. at 855-56.
"' Id. at 856.
132 Id. at 858.
193 Id. at 855.
134 Id.
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Supreme Court found that the savings resulting from the substantially lower
cost of apartments at Co-op City were not profits within the meaning of
Howey.'" The Court based its finding on the fact that the low rent was derived
from the substantial financial subsidies provided by New York State.'" Conse-
quently, the profit did not result from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others.'" The Court concluded that the shares of stock were "a recoverable
deposit on an apartment, " 138 and that selling them did not constitute a sale of
securities for purposes of the federal securities laws. 199
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniell" narrowed the Howey test by
adding the requirement that the security be supported by a separable element
of consideration.'" The issue in Daniel was whether an employee's interest in a
compulsory • pension plan constituted a security within the meaning of the
security acts."' Under the terms of the plan, the employees paid nothing into
the pension fund, exercised no choice regarding participation in the plan and
could not demand that the employer's contribution be paid directly to the em-
ployee in lieu of pension eligibility."' Eligible employees'" received pension
benefits upon retirement in a fixed amount determined by a formula."' The
employee bringing suit in Daniel contended that by allowing his employer to
pay money into the fund and by laboring for the employer in return for these
payments, he had made the type of investment that satisfies Howey.'"
The Daniel Court rejected the employee's contention, reasoning that the
purported investment in the pension plan was a relatively insignificant part of
an employer's total and indivisible compensation package."' The Court
stressed that the typical employee receives a compensation package that is
"substantially devoid of aspects resembling a security." 148 The Court noted
that an employee's decision to accept and retain employment covered by a pen-
sion plan may have only an "attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived in-
vestment possibilities of a future pension." 149 In essence, the employer's in-
1 " Id.
"6 Id.
" 7 Id.
1 " Id. at 842.
139 Id. at 859-60.
140 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
' 4 ' Id. at 560.
142 Id. at 553.
Id.
144
 Eligibility required twenty years of continuous service. Id. at 554.
14' For a more exhaustive description of the plan, see Kelly, Securities Regulation of Retire-
ment Plans After Daniel, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 635-40 (1979).
146 The Daniel Court noted that the employee contended that Ihe investment was of the
type the securities acts were intended to regulate. 439 U.S. at 559.
147
 Id. at 560.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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terest in the pension plan failed Howey's investment-of-money requirement
because it was impossible to distinguish a separable element constituting con-
sideration for the alleged security.' 50
The Daniel Court also noted that the enactment of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) "undercut" the contention that an
employee's interest in the pension plan was a security within the meaning of
the securities acts. 15 ' The Court grounded this comment on its finding that
whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the securities acts
were provided in more definite form through ERISA.'" The enactment of
ERISA, however, was not dispositive of the issue of whether the employee's in-
terest in the compulsory pension constituted a security.'" The Court indicated
that ERISA would have "put the matter to rest" if further evidence were
needed to demonstrate that the pension plan in question was not a security for
purposes of the federal securities acts.' 54 Thus, the Court's observations con-
cerning the benefits derived from ERISA were dicta. 155
In the interim between Daniel and Marine Bank v. Weaver, therefore, the
refined Howey test included three distinct requirements. First, an individual
must have invested money in a common enterprise' 56 such that there was a sep-
arable element constituting consideration for the security.'" Second, an indiv-
idual investor must have been led to expect profits'" that did not take the form
of a commodity for personal consumption.'" Third, the expected profits must
have been derived solely' 6° from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
10 Id. The Daniel Court also considered whether the employee's interest in the pension
plan met the profits requirement of Howey. Id. at 561-62. The Court conceded that the pension
plan depended to some extent upon earnings from its assets. Id. The Court, however,
distinguished the pension fund in question by the fact that a much larger portion of its income
was derived from employer contributions. Id. at 562. The Court concluded that this source of in-
come was not dependent on the efforts of the pension plan's managers. Id. Consequently, the
Court found that Howey's profit requirement was not met. Id. The Court supported this finding
with its observation that the principle barrier to an individual employee realizing pension benefits
was not the financial health of the fund. Id. Rather, it was the employee's ability to meet the
fund's eligibility requirements. Id. The Court noted that even assuming arguendo that it was prop-
er to characterize the benefits as a profit, this profit would depend primarily on the employee's ef-
forts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than the fund's investment success. Id.
151
 Id. at 569-70.
'" Id. at 570.
I" Id. at 569-70.
164 Id. at 569.
175
 In Marine Bank v. Weaver, however, the rationale underlying these observations was
dispositive of the Weavers' argument that their certificate of deposit constituted a security. 455
U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982). See infra notes 164-82 and accompanying text for a further examination
of the role this rationale played in Marine Bank.
156
 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). See supra note 91 on issue of
whether the common enterprise requirement requires "horizontal commonality," or whether
"vertical commonality" fulfills the common enterprise requirement.
'" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979).
156
 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
' 59 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
' 6° For a discussion of how the requirement that the profits result solely from the efforts
1068	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 24:1053
others."' Additionally, the Daniel dicta indicates that the existence of federal
legislation other than the securities acts may undercut the contention that the
instrument in question is a security. 162
 This may be the case if an individual
derived from such legislation all the benefits provided by the securities acts.'"
II. THE HOWEY TEST AFTER MARINE BANK V WEAVER
This section of the casenote analyzes the importance of the Supreme
Court's decision in Marine Bank in four subsections. First:, the Supreme Court's
reasoning for finding that neither the certificate of deposit nor the agreement
between the Weavers and the Piccirillos constituted a security is examined.
The examination demonstrates that the Court added two requirements to
Howey — risk and uniqueness. The second subsection examines the signifi-
cance of Marine Bank, and suggests that by adding the requirements of risk and
non-uniqueness, Marine Bank narrows what is a security for purposes of the
federal securities acts. This suggestion is evidenced by demonstrating that both
the certificate of deposit and the agreement between the Weavers and the Pic-
cirillos would have been securities under the Howey test. The impact of Marine
Bank on security law is also examined in this subsection. It is suggested that in
the wake of Marine Bank, state blue sky laws, common law and federal regula-
tions that regulate securities have gained increased importance in securities
law. The next subsection critiques Marine Bank's risk and non-uniqueness re-
quirements. The critique demonstrates that while Marine Bank's risk and non-
uniqueness requirements provide some guidance in determining what con-
stitutes a- security, they are problematic because the Court failed to make suffi-
ciently clear how to apply them. The final section, therefore, proposes a
modification that remedies these problems of Marine Bank's risk and non-
uniqueness requirements.
A. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in Marine Bank v. Weaver
In Marine Bank, the Supreme Court ruled that neither the certificate of
deposit nor the agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos constituted
a security for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 164 The Court, in
reaching this decision, recognized the broad scope encompassed by the defini-
tion of a security for purposes of federal security laws."' The Court observed,
however, that the statute excluded instruments if the context otherwise re-
of others has been relaxed, see supra note 92.
161
 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman. 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (efforts must be en-
treprenturia/ or managerial ); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (the profits must
result from efforts of others).
162
 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979).
163
 Id. at 570.
164
 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982). The Weavers alleged that
Marine Bank violated S 106 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 554.
163
 Id. at 555.
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quires.... ' 166
 In examining the context surrounding the two instruments in
Marine Bank, the Court concluded that circumstances existed which distin-
guished the instruments from those commonly considered securities.' 67 In
distinguishing the certificate of deposit and agreement between the Weavers
and the Piccirillos in Marine Bank from securities within the meaning of the fed-
eral securities law, the Court modified the Howey test by further defining the
proper context for a security.
The Marine Bank Court considered the two instruments separately. 168
First, the Court determined that the certificate of deposit was not a security
because it did not involve risk to the investor.' 69
 In analyzing the certificate of
166 Id. at 556.
167
 Id. at 557-60.
"8 Id. at 556-60.
' 69
 Id. at 557-59.
Interestingly, Marine Bank s. Weaver constituted the Court's first treatment of the security
status of notes. Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 846 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
Sonnenschein, Federal Securities Laws Coverage of Note Transactions; Antifraud Provisions, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1567, 1569 (1980). While a thorough examination of note securities is beyond the scope of
this article, it should be pointed out that prior to Marine Bank, at least four approaches were uti-
lized by the courts in resolving the question of when a note becomes a security. One approach
was the Howey test. See SEC v. First Am. Bank and Trust Co., 421 F.2d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 1973);
MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 439 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 & n.9 (E.D. Va. 1977).
This approach has been criticized on the grounds that notes cannot pass the Howey test because
they bear fixed rates of interest. Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 846-47
(N.D. Cal. 1982). This criticism is based on the Supreme Court's definition of profits under
Howey as either "capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial investment
... or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of the investors' funds .... " United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). Another approach is the
"commercial-investment" test. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.
1974). This approach distinguishes between investment and commercial transactions in deter-
mining whether a note is a security. Comment, When is a Note a Security?, 18 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 757, 763 (1978). The "commercial-investment" test involves a case-by-case comparison of
the note with opposing archetypes — common stock which is plainly a security, and consumer
loans and bank loans to finance the purchase of an automobile which are not securities. See, e. g. ,
C.N.S. Enter., Inc. v. G. & G. Enter., Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
825 (1975). This approach has been criticized for providing "little to no" guidance. Wolf v. Ban-
co Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
A third approach is the "risk capital" approach. See Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona
Mall, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); Great Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252 (9th Cir. 1976); Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13
Cal. Rptr. 189 (1961). Under this approach, the inquiry is whether there has been a contribution
of "risk capital" — which is to be distinguished from a "risky loan" — that is subject to the
entrepreneurial efforts of the party receiving the contribution. Great Western Bank & Trust Co.
v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976). This approach has been criticized as being too
open-ended. Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 849 (N.D. Cal. 1982). This
approach has also been criticized as finding a security where there is risk capital even though the
provider of capital may not be seeking profits or investing in a common enterprise as required by
Howey. Deacon & Prendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman Decision, 11 PACIFIC L.J. 213,
222 (1980). The final approach is that used by the Second Circuit. Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976). Under this approach, the Second Circuit in-
terprets the language of the securities acts' definitional sections literally unless the context other-
wise requires. Id. at 1137. Under this test, the burden of demonstrating that the context other-
wise requires is placed upon the party asserting that: (1) a note of more than nine months maturi-
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deposit, the Court distinguished it from other long-term debt obligations on
two grounds. First, the Court observed that the certificate of deposit was issued
by a federally regulated bank.'" As such, the certificate of deposit was issued
by an institution subject to comprehensive federal banking regulations, and
was protected by the reserve, reporting and inspection requirements of the
federal banking laws."' Therefore, the certificate of deposit in Marine Bank,
unlike many other long-term debt obligations, was protected by federal regula-
tions other than the securities acts.'"
The Court in Marine Bank also distinguished the certificate of deposit from
other long-term debt obligations on the grounds that the certificate of deposit
was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.). 13 The
Court found this significant in light of its observation that nearly all depositors
in failing F.D.I.C. insured banks have received payment in full." 4 Based on
this observation, the Court determined that the certificate of deposit in Marine
Bank was distinguishable from other long-term debt obligations because "the
purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaranteed payment in-full,
whereas the holder of an ordinary long-term debt obligation assumes the risk of
the borrower's insolvency."'" The Court, therefore, based its conclusion that
the certificate of deposit in Marine Bank was not a security on its finding that the
federal banking regulations and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
insurance protection eliminated the risk to the investor, and thereby obviated
the need for the federal securities laws. 16
Marine Bank marks the first time that the Court has elevated the risk re-
quirement to the level of an independent criterion for determining whether a
given instrument qualifies as a security for purposes of federal securities law.
The rationale underlying the risk requirement of Marine Bank, however, did ap-
pear earlier in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel.'" In Daniel, the
Court noted that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) undercut the argument that the pension plan in question constituted
ty is not within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (2) that a note with a maturity of nine
months or less is within the act or; (3) that any note is not within the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933. Id. at 1137-38. For the text of the securities acts' definition of
security, see supra note 7.
The Marine Bank Court did not explicitly adopt any of these approaches. It may be
argued, however, that the decision supports the "risk capital" test because the Court eliminated
the certificate of deposit on the grounds of risk. See supra notes 168-82. This argument, however,
is undermined by the fact that despite not explicitly addressing the Homey test in the context of the
certificate of deposit, the Marine Bank Court demonstrated no inclination to relax Hotug's profit-
seeking and common enterprise requirements.
' 7° Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558 (1982).
1 ' 1 Id.
' 72 Id.
1 " Id.
"4 Id.
176 Id. (emphasis added).
"6 Id. at 558-59.
'" 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979). For the appearance of the rationale underlying Marine
Bank's risk requirement, see supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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a security for the purposes of the federal securities laws." 8 The Daniel Court
reasoned that any protection which the employee might be afforded through
the security acts was provided through ERISA.' 79 Despite articulating the ra-
tionale for the "at risk" standard, however, the Court in Daniel grounded its
holding on its findings that there was no separable element constituting con-
sideration for the supposed security,"° and that a substantial portion of the ex-
pected profits did not come from the managerial efforts of others.'" In contrast
to Daniel, Marine Bank elevated the "at risk" requirement to be independently
dispositive of whether an instrument qualifies as a security for federal securities
law. 182
The Marine Bank Court next considered the agreement between the Weav-
ers and the Piccirillos.'" The Court determined that this agreement was not a
security for purposes of federal securities law because it was too unique.'" The
Court noted that this uniqueness indicated that the agreement .was not de-
signed to be traded publicly." 18 ' The Court supported its determination that
the agreement was too unique to be a security with three observations. First,
the agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos — unlike instruments
that qualified for federal securities law — did not involve offers to a number of
potential investors.'" The Court highlighted this observation by noting that
the Piccirillos did not distribute a prospectus to either the Weavers or any other
potential investors.'" Second, the Court observed that the provision that the
Weavers could use the barn and pastures at the discretion of the Piccirillos
rendered the agreement unique as compared with securities deemed within the
meaning of the federal securities acts.'" Finally, the Court noted that the
Weavers' veto power over future loans gave them a measure of control over the
slaughterhouse uncharacteristic of a security.' 89 Consequently, the Court de-
termined that the combination of these characteristics rendered the agreement
between the Weavers and the Piccirillos too unique to constitute a security
within the meaning of the federal securities acts.'" The Court distinguished
the instruments in C. M. Joiner Leasing and Howey from the agreement between
the Weavers and the Piccirillos by noting that they "had equivalent values to
most persons and could have been traded publicly.'" 9 ' After Marine Bank,
178 439 U.S. at 569-70.
"9 Id. at 570.
105 Id. at 560.
18 ' Id. at 561-62.
182 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982).
1 " Id. at 559-60.
S84
 Id.
85 Id. at 560.
186 Id. at 559-60.
t87 Id. at 560.
1 " Id.
189 Id.
1 " Id.
t9t Id. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the instrument in
Joiner, and see supra notes 77-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the instrument in
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therefore, if an instrument is found to be too unique, it may not be deemed a
security within the meaning of federal securities law.' 92
In essence, in determining that neither the certificate of deposit nor the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos in Marine Bank constituted a
security for purposes of the federal securities acts, the Marine Bank Court added
two requirements to the Howey test. First, there may not be any federal regula-
tions or insurance schemes that eliminate the risk involved in the invest-
ment. 193 Second, the instruments in question may not be too unique.'" After
Marine Bank, therefore, the Howey test for finding a "security" has acquired
further refinements, requiring five, rather than the previous three,'" separate
inquiries. First, an investor must invest money in a common enterprise 196 such
that the security is supported by a separable element constituting consider-
ation."' Second, the investor must expect profits'" that cannot be in the form
of a commodity for personal consumption.' 99 Third, the profits must be gained
solely200 through the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. 20 ' Fourth,
there cannot be any federal regulations or insurance schemes that eliminate the
risk to the investor. 202 Finally, the security may be disqualified if it is too
unique."' Given the inclusion of the fourth and fifth inquiries as distinct
criteria, Marine Bank is likely to bring about modifications in the application of
the securities laws. This casenote now addresses this concern.
B. The Signcance and Impact of Marine Bank v. Weaver
In Marine Bank, the Court narrowed what constitutes a security by adding
the requirements of risk and non-uniqueness to the Howey test. This narrowing
may be illustrated by demonstrating that both the certificate of deposit and the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos in Marine Bank would have
survived scrutiny under the pre-Marine Bank Howey test. In the wake of the nar-
rower protection afforded by the securities acts, it is suggested that state blue
sky laws, common law and federal regulations that regulate particular financial
instruments have acquired greater significance.
Howey.
192 455 U.S. at 560.
12' Id. at 557-59.
199 Id. at 559-60.
199 For a further discussion of these three inquiries, see supra notes 79-163 and accompa-
nying text.
199 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). See supra note 91 for a further
discussion of the common enterprise requirement.
122 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979).
198 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
199 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
20° For an examination of the trend to relax the requirement that the profits result solely
from the efforts of others, see supra note 92.
20 ' Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (efforts must be entrepreneurial or managerial ); SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (profits must be gained through efforts of others).
202 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982).
2°3 Id. at 559-60.
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Prior to Marine Bank, the Howey test consisted of three elements.'" The
first prong of the pre-Marine Bank Howey test requires that the investor invest his
money in a common enterprise such that there is a separable element con-
stituting consideration for the instrument.'" The certificate of deposit in
Marine Bank — which had a face value of $50,000, paid 71/2 % interest, and was
issued by Marine Bank to the Weavers 2 D 6
 — survives scrutiny under the first
prong of this test. The $50,000 invested by the Weavers in a certificate of
deposit issued by Marine Bank constitutes an investment of money in a com-
mon enterprise. The $50,000 investment by the Weavers also constitutes a
separable element of consideration for the certificate of deposit. Therefore,
since the Weavers invested $50,000 in a common enterprise, and the $50,000
constituted a separable element of consideration for the certificate of deposit,
the certificate of deposit satisfies the first requirement of the pre-Marine Bank
Homy test.
The second prong of the pre-Marine Bank Howey test is also met by the cer-
tificate of deposit in Marine Bank. The second prong requires that the investor
be led to expect profits that may not take the form of a commodity for personal
consumption."' The Weavers were led to expect profits from their investment
in the certificate of deposit because the certificate of deposit paid 7 1/2 % in-
terest.'" Furthermore, the interest payments took the form of cash — not a
commodity for personal consumption. Therefore, since the Weavers were led
to expect profits in the form of 71/2 % interest on the $50,000 certificate of
deposit, the $50,000 certificate of deposit falls within the second requirement of
the pre-Marine Bank Howey test. The certificate of deposit also satisfies the third
element of the pre-Marine Bank Howey test — that the expected profits result
solely through the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. 209 The cer-
tificate of deposit's interest payment was to be gained solely through the en-
trepreneurial and managerial efforts of Marine Bank. The certificate of
deposit, therefore, meets the third requirement of the pre-Marine Bank Howey
test.
2" See supra notei 156-63 and accompanying text.
2°3
	 Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979) (investment
must be made such that there is a separable element of consideration); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (investor must invest in a common enterprise).
2°6
 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 552, 553, n.1 (1982).
207 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (profits cannot be
in form of commodity for personal consumption); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946) (investor must be led to expect profits).
2" This conclusion is supported by at least two recorded decisions. See SEC v. First
American Bank and Trust Co., 421 F.2d 673, 679 (8th Cir. 1973) and MacKethan v. Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell & Co., 439 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 & n.9 (E.D. Va. 1977). There are, however,
decisions to be contrary. See Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465,
468-70 (7th Cir. 1980); Hamblett v. Board of Say. & Loan Ass'n, 472 F. Supp. 158, 165 (N.D.
Miss. 1979) and Hendrickson v. Buchbinder, 465 F. Supp. 1250, 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (all
reasoning that a fixed interest rate does not satisfy Howey's profit requirement because it is not
based on the enterprise's profitability).
109 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (profits must result
from entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
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The certificate of deposit in Marine Bank, however, seems to run afoul of
the Supreme Court's suggestion in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Danielm concerning the existence of federal legislation that regulates the instru-
ment. In Daniel, the Supreme Court suggested that the existence of federal
legislation that regulates the instrument in question would undercut the con-
tention that the instrument is a security if that legislation provided the investor
with all the benefits provided by the securities acts. 2 u The Daniel Court's sug-
gestion is pertinent in Marine Bank because Marine Bank is a federally
regulated bank. 212 Consequently, Marine Bank's deposits are protected by the
reserve, reporting and inspection requirements of the federal banking laws.'"
The Court's suggestion in Daniel concerning the existence of federal legislation,
however, is not fatal to the certificate of deposit, because the suggestion is dic-
ta. 214
Thus; since the certificate of deposit passes the first three requirements of
the pre-Marine Bank Howey test and the dicta in Daniel is not fatal to the result,
the certificate of deposit would have constituted a security if the Marine Bank
Court had not expanded upon the "at risk" requirement.
Concerning the contractual agreement between the Weavers and the Pic-
cirillos,. the Third Circuit determined that a jury could find that it passed the
pre-Marine Bank Howey test. 215 Applying the pre-Marine Bank Howey test, the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos survives scrutiny under the
first prong, which requires a common enterprise investment and separable con-
sideration. 216 The Weavers made an investment in a common enterprise by
depositing $50,000 in Marine Bank to secure the $65,000 loan to Columbus
Packing. The pledge of the certificate of deposit as security constituted a
separable element of consideration for the agreement. The first prong of the
pre-Marine Bank Howey test, therefore, is satisfied by the agreement. The agree-
ment also satisfies the second prong of the earlier test, which requires that in-
vestors expect profits that are not in the form of a commodity for personal con-
sumption. 217 By the terms of the agreement, the Weavers were led to expect
(1946) (profits must result from efforts of others).
210 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979).
211 Id.
212 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558 (1982).
213 Id.
214 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979). For further
discussion of this dicta, see supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
212 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1980), reo'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982). The Third Circuit did not explicitly state that a jury could find that the agreement be-
tween the Weavers and the Piccirillos passed the Howey test. Id. Rather, the Third Circuit cited
Howey, noted its requirements, and determined that a jury could find that the agreement between
the Weavers and the Piccirillos met these requirements. Id.
216 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979) (investment
must be made such that there is separable element of consideration for the instrument); SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (investor must invest money in a common enter-
prise).
217 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975) (profits cannot be
July 1983]	 CASENOTES	 1075
profits in three forms: one hundred dollars per month, fifty percent of Colum-
bus Packing's "adjusted net profits" and the use of the barn and pastures of
the slaughterhouse at the Piccirillos' discretion. 218
 Neither the one hundred
dollars per month nor the fifty percent of Columbus Packing's "adjusted net
profits" are commodities for personal consumption. Further, while the use of
the barn and pastures of the slaughterhouse may be in the form of a commodity
for personal consumption, their use seems to be an incidental purpose of the
transaction. 219 A reasonable fact finder, therefore, could determine that the
Weavers' $50,000 investment was primarily motivated by a desire to earn one
hundred dollars per month and fifty percent of Columbus Packing's "adjusted
net profits. " 220 The dispositive personal consumption element of housing in
Forman, therefore, is distinguishable because it was the primary purpose of the
transaction."' Consequently, the second requirement of the pre-Marine Bank
Howey test is met.
Finally, the agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos meets the
third pre-Marine Bank Howey requirement that the profits result solely from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. 222 This prong is satisfied by the
agreement in Marine Bank because both the one hundred dollars per month and
the fifty percent of Columbus Packing's "adjusted net profits" were to be
gained through the entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of the Piccirillos. 223
Therefore, since the agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos sur-
in form of commodity for personal consumption); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946) (investor must be led to expect profits).
218
 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 455 U.S. 551
(1982).
219 The Circuit Court indicated the importance of this primary incidental distinction by
stating that "[ill a fact finder were to determine that use of the barn and pasture was a primary
rather than an incidental purpose of the transaction, it might well decide in favor of Marine
Bank." Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162, rev'd, 155 U.S. 551 (1982).
22°
 Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162, rev'd, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
221 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
222 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (profits must result
from entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others); SEC v. W.f. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946) (profits must result from efforts of others),
223 Another issue concerns whether the Howey requirement that the profits result solely
from the efforts of others has been violated. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
There has, however, been a trend towards relaxing this requirement. See supra note 92. In Marine
Bank, the issue is whether the Weavers' veto power over future loans allowed them a degree of
participation in the slaughterhouse such that the requirement that the profits be expected solely
through the efforts of others was not met. Based on its findings that "there [was] no evidence
whatsoever in the record that the Weavers wanted to use or develop the Columbus Packing
slaughterhouse themselves," and that it did not appear that the Weavers "were issuing their
obligations to purchase a business they intended to manage," the Third Circuit distinguished the
efforts of the Weavers from those which result in an instrument being disqualified for not deriv-
ing profits solely from the efforts of others. Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 162 & n.5
(1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 551 (1982). The appeals court's analysis seems correct
because the degree of control conferred on the Weavers by their veto power over future loans to
the slaughterhouse did not rise to a level such that they could safeguard their own investment
through involvement in the slaughterhouse's management.
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vives scrutiny under the pre-Marine Bank Howey test, 224 it would have been a
security if the Marine Bank Court had not promulgated the uniqueness require-
ment.
Despite this analysis suggesting that both the certificate of deposit and the
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos were securities under the
pre-Marine Bank Howey test, the Supreme Court determined in Marine Bank that
neither instrument constituted a security for purposes of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. 225 In reaching its determination that neither instrument
was a security, the Court added the requirements of "risk" and "non-
uniqueness" to the Howey test. 226 By adding these requirements to the Howey
test, therefore, the Court in Marine Bank effectively narrowed the class of in-
struments qualifying as securities under the federal securities acts.
By adding the two new requirements to the Howey test, the Marine Bank
Court has made it more difficult for potential investors to sue in the federal
courts under the federal securities acts. A prospective plaintiff must now not
only establish that the transaction in question satisfies the three prongs of
Howey, but must also demonstrate that it passes the risk and non-uniqueness
tests laid down in Marine Bank. Indeed, the facts of Marine Bank provide a clear
example of this difficulty. Since the two instruments involved in Marine Bank
may well have survived scrutiny under the Howey test,'" by adding the risk and
non-uniqueness requirements, the Court determined that the Weavers could
not claim the securities acts' protection. 228
As a result of this higher barrier to invoking protection under the federal
securities acts, plaintiffs will be forced to pursue their claims in the state courts
under common law and state blue sky laws. 229 Consequently, state blue sky
laws and common law protections arguably have acquired far greater impor-
tance in the securities regulation field. Due to the elevated status accorded state
law as an indirect result of the Marine Bank decision, practitioners must now
consider more seriously state law claims, in addition to federal remedies where
available when litigating a matter involving a borderline instrument.
From a plaintiff's perspective, there are several procedural disadvantages
to litigating security claims in state courts. An obvious procedural disadvant-
age is the elimination of the plaintiff's previous option of bringing a securities
claim under federal or state law. 230 If the plaintiff had such an option, she could
choose to bring suit under the law which provided the most protection.
Moreover, litigants bringing claims actionable only under state law must con-
224 The uniqueness requirement was not a prong of the pre-Marine Bank Howey test. See
supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
225 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 559-60 (1982).
226 For a further discussion of the addition of these requirements, see supra notes 164-203
and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
226 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560-61 (1982).
229 "Blue Sky" is an expression used for state securities laws. See supra note 59.
2" Even if a plaintiff is in federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, the court must
apply state law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-80 (1938).
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sider whether the state court can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. To
demonstrate that the state court has jurisdiction, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant is within reach of the state's jurisdictional statute."' While
the federal securities acts extend jurisdiction as far as allowed by the due proc-
ess clause of the United States Constitution, 232 state jurisdictional statutes do
not always extend their jurisdiction as far."' State courts' jurisdictional re-
quirements, therefore, are often more stringent than federal courts' jurisdic-
tional requirements. 234
 Another procedural disadvantage confronting a plain-
tiff limited to the state court systems is the conflict of laws problem of which
state law governs the security. 235
 The federal securities acts, on the other hand,
provide certainty because they are uniform. By narrowing the definition of
security, therefore, Marine Bank disadvantages plaintiffs by barring them from
the procedural advantages of the federal securities acts.
In addition to increasing the importance of state securities laws, with the
consequent disadvantages to litigants, the Marine Bank Court has altered the
balance among federal regulatory statutes. By adding the requirements of risk
to the Howey test, the Court in Marine Bank increased the importance of federal
legislation other than the securities acts and insurance schemes. The Court dis-
qualified the certificate of deposit in Marine Bank on the grounds that federal
banking regulations and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance
coverage obviated the need for protection under the securities acts by suffi-
ciently protecting investors from risk. In doing so, the Court demonstrated that
if there is federal legislation and/or an insurance scheme sufficiently protective
of investments that it eliminates investor risk, the investment in question will
not qualify as a security for purposes of the federal security acts. Consequently,
after Marine Bank, a court faced with novel instruments must consider the
following to determine whether that instrument is within the purview of federal
securities law. First, the court must determine whether the instrument is
regulated by federal legislation other than the securities acts. Next, it must de-
termine whether the instrument is covered by an insurance scheme. If the court
231 See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil
1068 (1969 & Supp. 1982).
" 2
 For the broad jurisdictional provision of the Securities Act of 1933, see the Securities
Act of 1933, 5 22, 15 U.S.C. $ 77v (1976). For the equally broad jurisdictional provision of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 27, 15 U. S.0 . 77aa
(1976). The jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 have been interpreted to extend their reach as far as the due process clause of the fifth
amendment will allow. See Bench v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 446, 459.60 (S.D.
N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 519 F.2d 974(2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
233 See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil 5
1068 (1969 & Supp. 1982). Additionally, FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) authorizes service of process
anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held. FED R. CIV.
P. 4(f).
254 Id.
233
 Both forum and foreign states' blue sky laws have been applied to regulate securities.
See generally EHRENZWEIG, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 146 (1962).
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concludes that either of these conditions is met, it must determine whether the
federal legislation and/or the insurance scheme eliminate(s) the risk to the in-
vestor. After Marine Bank, therefore, insurance schemes and federal legislation
other than the securities acts have become more important in federal regulation
of investment instruments.
In summary, by adding the requirements of risk and non-uniqueness to
the Howey test, the Court in Marine Bank narrowed the class of instruments
qualifying as securities for purposes of the federal securities acts. Consequent-
ly, the Court has made it more difficult for potential investors to sue in the fed-
eral courts under the federal securities acts. This heightened barrier to invok-
ing federal court jurisdiction will force practitioners to consider very seriously
state law causes of action, as well as federal remedies, and will force many
plaintiffs to pursue their securities claims under common law and state blue sky
legislation. , Plaintiffs who are forced to seek state remedies will confront the
procedural disadvantages of having no choice between suing under state or fed-
eral law, having to satisfy the state's possibly more limited personal jurisdiction
requirements, and having to prove to a court which state's law governs the
security. Finally, by adding the requirement of risk to the Howey test, the
Marine Bank Court increased the importance of insurance schemes and federal
legislation other than the securities acts in federal "regulation of investment in-
struments.
C. A Critique of Marine Bank v. Weaver's tusk and Non-Uniqueness Requirements
Marine Bank's risk and non-uniqueness requirements do provide potential
investors with some guidance for determining whether a borderline instrument
qualifies as a security. Under these requirements, an instrument cannot be a
security unless it is not too unique, and unless it involves some risk to the in-
vestor. 236
 Marine Bank's risk and non-uniqueness requirements, however, are
problematic because the Court did not articulate a clear standard to determine
whether an instrument complies with these requirements.
In concluding that the certificate of deposit was disqualified for purposes
of federal securities law, the Court in Marine Bank did not engage in an in-depth
analysis of how and why the federal banking regulations contributed to ob-
viating the need for federal securities law."' The Court's decision noted that
Marine Bank was subject to comprehensive federal banking regulations, and
that Marine Bank's deposits were protected by the reserve, reporting and in-
spection requirements of federal banking law. 238
 Based on this premise, the
Court, without any further analysis of the protection afforded by the banking
"6 See supra notes 164-203 and accompanying text.
287 The Court did indicate that the certificate of deposit was subject to federal banking
laws. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 588 (1982). It did not, however, articulate an in-
depth analysis comparing the protection afforded by the federal banking taws with the protection
afforded by the securities acts.
"' Id. at 558.
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regulations and laws, concluded that the need for the federal securities acts was
undercut because the certificate of deposit in Marine Bank was "abundantly
protected under the federal banking laws. " 239
 The Court, however, did not
demonstrate how and why the federal banking laws provided the holder of a
certificate of deposit a degree of protection such that the risk to the holder was
eliminated and the need for the federal securities acts was obviated. Conse-
quently, Marine Bank does not provide clear guidance on either the depth of
analysis or the amount of fact finding that a court must conduct before it deter-
mines that other federal legislation obviates application of federal securities
law. Additionally, by not conducting an in-depth analysis, Marine Bank does
not provide a clear signal as to how much risk is necessary to require the pro-
tection of federal securities law.
The Court in Marine Bank, however, did establish a clear standard to
determine whether an insurance scheme eliminates the risk of a borrower's in-
solvency. The Marine Bank Court concluded that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's insurance coverage eliminated the certificate of deposit's risk of
loss because nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by the F.D.I.C. have
received payment in full. 24° Marine Bank, therefore, indicates that an insurance
scheme does not eliminate the risk of a borrower's insolvency unless the in-
surance guarantees payment in full to nearly all investors protected by it.
In determining that the agreement between the Weavers and the Pic-
cirillos did not constitute a security because it was too unique, the Marine Bank
Court did not establish a clear standard to determine when an instrument
passes its uniqueness requirement. In Marine Bank, the Court based its
uniqueness conclusion on three findings. 241
 First, the guarantee agreement was
not offered to a number of potential investors. 242
 Second, the provision that the
Weavers could use the slaughterhouse's barn and pastures rendered the
guarantee agreement unlike instruments that qualify as securities under the
federal securities acts.'" Third, the Weavers' veto power over future loans pro-
vided them with a measure of control uncharacteristic of a security.'" Instead
of articulating a clear standard for determining uniqueness, however, the
Court merely identified the agreement's unique characteristics, and deter-
mined that those characteristics rendered the agreement too unique to con-
239 Id. at 558-59.
240 Id. at 558.
211
 For a further examination of the Court's determination that the agreement between
the Weavers and the Piccirillos did not qualify as a security for purposes of the federal securities
acts, see supra notes 183-203 and accompanying text.
242 455 U.S. at 559. In reaching this finding, the Court in Marine Bank did not provide a
clear standard as to the number of potential investors an alleged security must be offered to
before the alleged security qualifies for the federal securities laws' protection. In Marine Bank, the
Court's holding is confined to the situation where an offer is made to only one potential investor.
Id. Consequently, it is unclear how many potential investors an alleged security must be offered
to before the alleged security passes Marine Bank's non-uniqueness test.
243 Id. at 560.
244 Id.
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stitute a security. 245
 Consequently, the Court's non-uniqueness requirement
does not provide courts, practitioners and potential investors with a clear
standard to determine how much uniqueness is permissible before an instru-
ment is disqualified as a security.
In sum, the Court in Marine Bank did not formulate well-defined standards
to determine whether an instrument qualifies under its risk and non-unique-
ness tests. Consequently, the Marine Bank decision does not provide a clear
signal as to how the risk and non-uniqueness requirements are to be applied.
Given these inherent ambiguities, it is apparent that standards must be devised
to aid in application.
D. A Modcation of Marine Bank's Risk and Non-Uniqueness Requirements
Establishing clear standards for the application of Marine Bank's risk and
non-uniqueness requirements is important because it provides practitioners,
courts and investors with guidance in determining whether an instrument is
within the pale of federal securities law. Proper standards must be structured
such that the purpose for enacting the federal securities acts is attained. 246 The
primary purpose for enacting the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 was to eliminate abuses in a largely unregulated securities
market. 247 Hence, any test for determining which instruments qualify as
securities should not allow the circumvention of the Federal securities acts
unless the purpose of these acts can be attained in an equally effective manner
by other means. 248 In this respect, the Marine Bank Court may have been in-
complete in its risk and non-uniqueness analyses because it did not promulgate
a clear standard on how these requirements should be applied to insure that the
purposes of the federal securities acts are not frustrated. By failing to formulate
a clear standard with respect to the risk and non-uniqueness requirements, the
Marine Bank Court has created the danger that these requirements may be
misapplied. If these requirements are misapplied, instruments may be dis-
qualified for protection under the federal securities acts, when, in fact, they
should be deemed deserving of such protection.
In concluding that the risk requirement was not satisfied by the Weavers'
pledge, the Marine Bank Court failed to undertake an in-depth analysis of how
and why the federal banking regulations attained the purposes of, and provided
the protection afforded by the federal securities laws. 249 The Court did cite the
pertinent regulation, and indicated that the certificate of deposit was protected
by reserve, reporting and inspection requirements. 25° Nonetheless, the Court
245 Id. For a further examination of the Court's determination, see supra notes 183-203
and accompanying text.
246 For the purpose of enacting the federal securities acts, see supra note 4.
2" Id.
246 For the purposes of the federal securities acts, see supra note 4.
249 For a further discussion of the Marine Bank Court's failure to undertake an in-depth
analysis of how and why the federal banking regulations attained the purpose of and the protec-
tion afforded by the federal securities acts, see supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
23° Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 US 551. 558 (1982).
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failed to explain how the risk requirement should be applied by the lower courts
on a case-by-case basis. To remedy this fault, the following modification of the
Marine Bank risk requirement is proposed. The federal securities acts should be
available to a party seeking the federal securities laws' protection unless the op-
posing party can show that there is federal legislation other than the securities
acts which, by eliminating the risk of loss due to fraud, exploitation or
misrepresentation, obviates the need for the protection of the securities acts.
Under this requirement, federal legislation other than the securities acts would
displace the federal securities acts only when it provides protection substantially
equal to that of federal securities law. 2 " This recommended standard for Marine
Bank's risk requirement would guard against hasty and incomplete findings by
requiring courts to look into the facts of each case and the specific legislation
cited to determine whether the legislation provides protection substantially
equal to that of federal securities law.
Concerning the existence of an insurance scheme, the modified version of
Marine Bank's risk requirement would read as follows. The federal securities
acts should apply unless the opposing party can demonstrate that there is an in-
surance scheme which, by eliminating the risk of loss due to fraud, exploitation
or misrepresentation, obviates the need for the federal securities acts' protec-
tion. Under this standard, courts would have to look into the facts of each case
and the insurance scheme cited to decide whether the insurance scheme pro-
vides protection substantially equal to that of federal securities law. Conse-
quently, this test would guard against findings that the mere existence of an in-
surance scheme, regardless of the nature and extent of its coverage, undercuts
the need for federal securities law's protection. 252
This proposed risk standard remedies the ambiguities of Marini Bank's risk
requirement. First, by placing the burden of proof on the party opposing ap-
plication of federal securities law, it insures that courts conduct extensive fact
finding and analysis. Second, the proposed standard indicates how much risk is
necessary to require protection by the federal securities laws. If federal legisla-
tion other than the federal securities acts and/or an insurance scheme does not
provide protection substantially equal to that provided by the federal securities
acts, the instrument in question requires the federal securities acts' protection.
If, therefore, federal legislation other than the federal securities acts and/or an
insurance scheme do not eliminate at least as much risk as do the federal
securities acts, then the instruments in question cannot be disqualified from
751
 Substantially equal protection exists only if the federal legislation other than the
federal securities laws provides at least as much protection as is provided by the federal securities
laws. Under this standard, the issue of whether federal legislation other than the federal securities
laws displaces the federal securities acts is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
"' The mere existence of an insurance scheme does riot obviate the need for the federal
securities acts protection. An insurance scheme designed to protect an investor from a borrower's
insolvency does not necessarily protect the borrower from the risk of loss due to fraud, exploita-
tion or misrepresentation.
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federal securities law on the grounds of risk. Furthermore, consistent with the
purposes of the federal securities acts, the risk eliminated must be the risk of
loss due to fraud, misrepresentation, or exploitation."'
As with the risk analysis, the Court in Marine Bank did not articulate a
standard to determine whether an instrument passes its non-uniqueness re-
quirement.'" The Court's analysis indicates neither the number of persons to
which an alleged security must be offered,'" nor the degree of uniqueness to be
tolerated before an instrument is rendered beyond the scope of federal
securities law.'" Consequently, it does not provide courts, investors and prac-
titioners with much guidance for determining whether an instrument passes
the non-uniqueness requirement.
To remedy the possible confusion surrounding the Marine Bank non-
uniqueness requirement, the correct standard, it is submitted, focuses on the
inverse of a marketable instrument. Under this standard, federal securities
laws are applicable unless the instrument in question is so unique that it is in-
capable of traveling through the public markets.'" In deciding whether an in-
255
 This is consistent with the purposes of the federal securities acts. See supra note 4 for
the purpose of enacting the federal securities acts.
2" For a further discussion of the Marine Bank Court's failure to articulate a standard to
determine whether an instrument passes its uniqueness test, see supra notes 241-45 and accompa-
nying text.
"' For a more comprehensive discussion of the Court's failure to establish a standard to
determine the number of persons to whom an alleged security must be offered before it qualifies
for federal securities law, see supra note 242.
256 For a discussion indicating that the Marine Bank Court did not articulate a standard to
determine the degree of uniqueness to be tolerated before an instrument is disqualified for pur-
poses of the federal securities acts, see supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
257
 This recommended uniqueness standard follows the approach suggested by Professor
Scott FitzGibbon. See FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 912-48. Professor FitzGibbon argued that a
security is a financial instrument eligible to participate in a public market. Id.
The recommended uniqueness standard is consistent with the Marine Bank Court's
analysis. The Marine Bank Court distinguished the agreement between the Piccirillos and the
Weavers from the instruments involved in Joiner and Homey on the grounds that the instruments
in the latter two cases "had equivalent values to most persons and could have been traded public-
ly." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982). By distinguishing the agreement be-
tween the Weavers and the Piccirillos on these grounds, the Court implied that the agreement
was incapable of traveling through the public markets, i.e., incapable of being traded publicly.
After distinguishing the agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos from the instruments
in Joiner and Homey, the Court identified the unique aspects of the security. Id. Therefore, Marine
Bank can be read as disqualifying the agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos on the
grounds that the agreement's uniqueness rendered it incapable of traveling through the public
markets. Furthermore, support for the recommended uniqueness standard is afforded by
language in the dissent to the Third Circuit's opinion. The dissenting opinion indicated that the
"agreement obviously is not in a standard form that could be issued to the public at large."
Weaver v. Marine Bank, 637 F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1980) (Weis, C. J., dissenting). The recom-
mended standard also finds support in language from Joiner and Forman. In Joiner, the Court
noted that "the term 'security' was defined to include by name or description many documents
in which there is common trading for speculation or investment." SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (emphasis added). In Forman, the Court stated that the focus of
the federal securities acts "is on the capital market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities
to raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges on which securities are traded, and the need
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strument is unique to the point of disqualification, a court must look into the
facts of each case and determine whether the unique aspect of the alleged secur-
ity effects whether it has an equivalent value to most persons. 258 If it is deter-
mined that despite the instrument's unique aspects, it has an equivalent value
to most persons, then the instrument is capable of passing through the public
markets, and survives the recommended uniqueness standard. Thus, it may
constitute a security for purposes of the federal securities acts. 259 If, however, it
is determined that the instrument's unique aspects cause the instrument to
have an unequal value to most persons, then the instrument is incapable of
passing through the public markets. Consequently, it does not comply with the
recommended uniqueness standard. This proposed uniqueness standard,
therefore, remedies the potential confusion arising from the Marine Bank
Court's failure to indicate the degree of uniqueness to be tolerated, 28° by re-
quiring that an instrument be disqualified on the grounds of non-uniqueness
only if it is so unique that it is incapable of traveling through the public
markets.
In summary, the standards here proposed for the risk and non-uniqueness
requirements imposed on the Howey test by Marine Bank further refine the
definition of 'security. ' ' Hence, an instrument is an investment contract, and
therefore is a security for purposes of the federal securities acts 261 if: (1) the in-
vestor invests money in a common enterprise 262
 such that there is a separable
element constituting consideration for the instrument, 263
 (2) the investor is led
for regulation to prevent fraud and to protect the interest of investors." United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (emphasis added).
2"
 This line of analysis draws support from Marine Bank. The Marine Bank Court
distinguished the agreement between the Piccirillos and the Weavers from the instruments in
joiner and Howry on the grounds that the instruments in the latter two cases had equivalent values
to most persons and could have been traded publicly." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560
(1982) (emphasis added). By distinguishing the agreement in question in Marine Bank on these
grounds, the Court implicitly indicated that to be capable of being traded publicly (being able to
travel through the public markets), an instrument must have an equivalent value to most per-
sons.
For a discussion relating an instrument's degree of uniqueness to the ability of the public
markets to perform their pricing function, see FitzGibbon, supra note 4, at 929. If an instrument
is so unique that it does not have an equivalent value to most persons, then the public markets
cannot perform their pricing function. Id. Consequently, the instrument is not capable of passing
through the public markets. Id.
259
 The instrument, however, must pass all three Homey requirements as well as the two
recommended risk and non-uniqueness standards before it qualifies as a security for purposes of
the federal securities acts. For a listing of the three Homey requirements with the recommended
standards of risk and non-uniqueness, see infra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
26°
 For an examination of the potential confusion arising from Marine Bank's non-
uniqueness requirement, see supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
261
	 the text of the statutory definitions of a security, see supra note 7. Included in
these definitions is the term investment contract. Id.
262
 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). For a discussion of the issue
of whether only "horizontal commonality" satisfies the common enterprise requirement, see
supra note 91.
263
 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1979).
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to expect profits 264
 that cannot be in the form of a commodity for personal con-
sumption , 265
 and (3) the expected profits are gained solely 266 through the entre-
preneurial or managerial efforts of others. 267 If these three requirements are
met, the instrument is a security within the meaning of the securities acts
unless: (1) the party seeking to disqualify the instrument can show that there is
an insurance scheme and/or federal legislation other than the securities acts
which, by eliminating the risk of loss due to fraud, exploitation, or misrepresen-
tation, obviates the need for the securities acts' protection, 268 or (2) the instru-
ment is so unique that it is incapable of traveling through the public markets. 269
CONCLUSION
In determining that neither the certificate of deposit nor the agreement be-
tween the Weavers and the Piccirillos were securities, the Marine Bank Court
narrowed the class of instruments constituting securities by adding the require-
ments of risk and non-uniqueness to the classical Howey test. By so narrowing
what constitutes a security for purposes of the federal securities acts, the Marine
Bank Court has made it more difficult for potential investors to sue in federal
courts under the federal securities acts. Consequently, more investors will be
forced to pursue their security claims in the state courts under common law and
state blue sky laws. Accordingly, after Marine Bank, common law and state blue
sky laws have become more important in securities law. Moreover, in the wake
of Marine Bank, insurance schemes and federal legislation other than the
securities acts have acquired increased significance since Marine Bank's risk re-
quirement ' disqualifies an instrument if federal legislation other than the
securities acts and/or an insurance scheme eliminate(s) the risk to the investor.
Finally, in promulgating the risk and non-uniqueness requirements, the Marine
Bank Court failed to establish clear standards for determining whether an in-
strument complies with these requirements. Consequently, Marine Bank does
not give courts, practitioners or investors much guidance for determining
whether an instrument passes its risk and non-uniqueness requirements. The
standards proposed for Marine Bank's two requirements remedy this problem
by providing measures against which courts, practitioners and investors can
determine whether an instrument is a security. By so doing, the casenote's pro-
posed standards provide greater guidance in determining whether an instru-
264 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
262 United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
266 The requirement that the profits result solely through the efforts of others has been
relaxed. See supra note 92.
267 United Haus. Found., Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 855 (1975) (requirement that
efforts of others be entrepreneurial or managerial); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946).
268 For a further discussion of this recommended risk standard, see supra notes 246-53
and accompanying text.
269 For a further discussion of this recommended uniqueness standard, see supra notes
254-60 and accompanying text.
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ment is a security for purposes of the federal securities acts. Since courts are
given more guidance under these recommended standards, the standards in-
crease the likelihood that bona fide securities will not be mistakenly excluded
from the federal securities acts' protection.
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